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ompensatory mitigation—the practice of offsetting
harm caused to natural resources at one location by
restoring, enhancing, creating, or preserving similar
resources at another location—has been the lubricant of natural resources permitting programs for over four
decades. Indeed, it is dificult to envision how regimes such
as the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) Section 404 program for
permitting development in jurisdictional wetlands, or the
Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) Section 10 program for permitting habitat impacts causing incidental take of protected
species, could operate without the option of compensatory
mitigation.
Yet, although compensatory mitigation is often referred
to as simply “mitigation,” the mitigation concept encompasses three distinct forms of harm-reduction measures, usually
applied in a hierarchy of preference. Consider a proposal for
a development that will affect protected resources and thus
requires a permit from a resource agency. The most preferred
form of mitigation in the hierarchy is avoidance, which could
involve revising the project design to reduce its footprint in
the protected areas. Next in the hierarchy is minimization,
which could involve taking measures in construction and
operation of the project to reduce the magnitude of harmful
impacts that cannot be avoided, such as by reducing sediment
runoff into the protected areas. In theory, compensation is the
last resort, which might require the project applicant to restore
a degraded area of similar resources in another location to offset harms to the protected areas that could not practicably be
further avoided or minimized. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20
(deining mitigation).
This so-called avoid-minimize-compensate “sequencing”
approach has evolved over time and has been controversial
every step of the way, with compensatory mitigation at the
center of its development and conlicts. For example, wetland mitigation banking, introduced in the 1990s to allow
large-scale restoration projects to sell compensatory mitigation
“credits” to multiple development projects needing to satisfy
permit conditions, radically transformed how mitigation is
practiced under CWA § 404. See Jessica Wilkinson and Jared
Thompson, 2005 Status Report on Compensatory Mitigation in the United States (ELI 2006), available at www.eli.org/
sites/default/iles/eli-pubs/d16_03.pdf. But from the program’s
earliest days, some raised concerns that “if mitigation banking lourishes, pressure will grow to use it before avoidance or
minimization measures are fully considered, resulting in even
more wetland destruction.” See Jeffrey Zinn, CRS Report for
Congress 97-849, Wetland Mitigation Banking Status and
Prospects 15–16 (Sept. 12, 1997), available at http://
congressionalresearch.com/97-849/document.php?study=
Wetland+Mitigation+Banking+Status+and+Prospects.
There has never been a coherent federal policy to guide
the evolution of mitigation and respond to these and other of
its controversial aspects. Different federal and state agencies
have designed and managed their own mitigation programs.
NR&E Fall 2016

Published in Natural Resources & Environment Volume 31, Number 2, Fall 2016. © 2016 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

The Council on Environmental Quality, for example, has
grappled for decades with how to integrate project mitigation
into the decision under the National Environmental Policy
Act of whether to require a full-blown environmental impact
statement. See Final Guidance for Federal Departments and
Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings
of No Signiicant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843 (Jan. 21, 2011).
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) essentially invented mitigation
banking in the mid-1990s to facilitate implementation of
CWA § 404, but until 2008 had no comprehensive regulatory
approach for compensatory mitigation. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 70 Fed. Reg. 19594
(Apr. 10, 2008). And the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS),
which geared up its ESA incidental take permit program in
the early 1990s, did not develop its own guidance on habitat conservation banking until 2003. See Guidance for the
Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks,
68 Fed. Reg. 24753 (May 8, 2003). This decentralized, ad hoc
approach to agencies’ mitigation policies may have seen its last
days at the federal level.
On November 3, 2015, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum aimed at unifying the mitigation practice
and policy for activities carried out and approved by the
Departments of Defense, Interior, and Agriculture, the EPA,
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
See Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed.
Reg. 68743 (Nov. 6, 2015). The broad policy goal of the Memorandum is to ensure that the agencies’ mitigation policies
“are clear, work similarly across agencies, and are implemented
consistently within agencies.” Id. at 68743. The Memorandum also emphasizes the need for transparency, measurable
performance standards, and clear policies regarding who is
responsible for what. Id. at 687465. The Memorandum develops four key themes working toward those goals.
First, the Memorandum unambiguously adopts the sequencing approach. Mitigation is deined as using “avoidance,
minimization, and compensation. These three actions are
generally applied sequentially.” Id. at 68745. The Memorandum further explains that it shall be the agencies’ policy
“to avoid and then minimize harmful effects to land, water,
wildlife, and other ecological resources (natural resources)
caused by land- or water-disturbing activities, and to ensure
that any remaining harmful effects are effectively addressed”
through compensatory mitigation where appropriate. Id. at
68743. In short, unless a statutory program imposes another
approach, the agencies must adopt the sequencing approach
and, in some cases, may be required to demand that projects emphasize avoidance. But the Memorandum does not
provide standards—such as feasibility, practicability, or costeffectiveness—for determining when a project may move from
avoidance to minimization to compensation. Also, it deines
“irreplaceable resources” as those which existing legal authorities recognize as “requiring particular protection” and thus
“because of their high value or function and unique character,
cannot be restored or replaced,” id., but leaves unclear what an
agency must do where an avoidance-only approach is not technologically or economically feasible.
The second major theme goes to the question of net outcome. The Memorandum requires that agency mitigation
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policies “should establish a net beneit goal or, at a minimum,
a no net loss goal for natural resources the agency manages.”
Id. at 68745. This ambitious goal is tempered with the qualiications that it applies only to resources that are “important,
scarce, or sensitive, or wherever doing so is consistent with
agency mission and established natural resources objectives.”
Id. Those key terms, however, are not deined.
In its third major theme, the Memorandum directs agencies
to “encourage advance compensation, including mitigation
bank-based approaches, in order to provide resource gains
before harmful impacts occur.” Id. at 68744. In a speciic directive to FWS, the Memorandum requires the agency to develop
a policy to provide clarity regarding actions landowners take to
conserve species in advance of potential listing under the ESA
and to “provide a mechanism to recognize and credit such
action as avoidance, minimization, and compensatory mitigation.” Id. at 68746. This suggests a broad meaning for programs
designed to promote conservation measures before regulatory
restrictions attach to an activity.
The fourth major theme of the Memorandum incorporates
the directives into the front end of agency land management
planning. The Memorandum explains that agencies’ “largescale plans and analysis should inform the identiication of
areas where development may be most appropriate, where high
natural resource values result in the best locations for protection and restoration, or where natural resource values are
irreplaceable.” Id. at 68744. Large-scale planning is deined
broadly, but clearly has in mind the planning required of the
federal public land management agencies. Id. at 68744. If, pursuant to this directive, agencies designate up-front which areas
are off limits and which are open for resource development,
that would reduce the need for mitigation at the back end of
speciic land permitting and approval decisions, such as timber
harvesting or grazing. Whether that has any practical impact
on the allocation of uses versus the existing planning practices
of agencies remains to be seen.
One implementation challenge the Memorandum faces
is that the statutes under which federal agencies have established mitigation practices vary widely in their incorporation
of mitigation into the planning or permitting program, if at
all. It is not clear how the sequencing and net outcome directives mesh with statutes that do not mention avoidance, much
less impose sequencing, in connection with “mitigation,” and
do not require a no-net loss or net beneit outcome for issuance of a permit. For example, the ESA § 10 incidental-take
permit program requires issuance of a permit so long as the
project “will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize
and mitigate the impacts of such taking” and any remaining impacts do “not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild.” 16 U.S.C.
1539(a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iv). Exactly what “minimize and mitigate” requires has been hotly contested, see Union Neighbors
United, Inc. v. Jewell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2015) (strict
sequencing is not required), and the “not appreciably reduce”
standard cannot plausibly be equated with a no net loss or net
beneit mandate. Indeed, it is likely for these reasons that the
Memorandum directs FWS to develop a special policy “that
applies to compensatory mitigation associated with its responsibilities under the [ESA].” Memorandum, 80 Fed. Reg. at
68746.
Other programs are far more open-ended about mitigation. The operative text of CWA § 404 does not so much as
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mention the concept, though Congress broadly endorsed compensatory mitigation in the statute that required the Corps
and EPA to develop rules implementing CWA § 404. See Pub.
L. No. 108-136, §314(b) (2003). If agencies working under
such statutes begin to implement the full sequencing and net
outcome directives of the Memorandum to their fullest meaning, they likely will face challenges from developers as to the
extent of their statutory authority.
Similarly, the advance compensation directive, which
builds on the banking concept, is likely to be controversial.
Most banking programs arise in the context of an extant regulatory regime. It will be far trickier to design an advance
compensation program that awards credits to conservation
actions put in place before regulatory controls are imposed,
such as habitat protection measures established prior to listing of a species under the ESA. In its initial proposal for such
a program, FWS sought input regarding how to structure
advance crediting. See Policy Regarding Voluntary Prelisting
Conservation Actions, 79 Fed. Reg. 42525 (July 22, 2014). As
of this writing, FWS has not returned with a inal policy.
Notwithstanding these challenges, agencies have begun to
implement the Memorandum directives. Their efforts thus far
range from exploratory to far along in developing proposals.
For example, the Forest Service issued a white paper in March
2016 announcing its intention to publish a policy implementing the Memorandum in late 2017 and requesting input on
over a dozen implementation questions. See U.S. Forest Service, Seeking Recommendations in Formulating Agency Policy on
Mitigating Adverse Impacts on National Forests and Grasslands
(Mar. 2016), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/
FSMitigationPolicy.htm. By contrast, the FWS issued an extensive set of proposed revisions to its mitigation policies, including
for ESA § 10 permitting, which closely track and expand upon
the Memorandum directives. See Proposed Revisions to the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed. Reg.
12380 (Mar. 8, 2016). Nor has the Memorandum escaped the
attention of Congress, as the House Committee on Natural
Resources held hearings on what it described as the “Obama
Administration’s new environmental mitigation regulations.”
See House Committee on Natural Resources, Press Release
(Feb. 24, 2016), available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/
newsroom/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400005.
The Memorandum clearly represents a milestone in federal natural resources mitigation policy. If agencies maximize
implementation of the sequencing, net outcome, advance
compensation, and large-scale planning directives, and do so
consistently, transparently, and with measurable performance
standards, mitigation in the United States would look considerably different from its present practice.
Mr. Ruhl is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law at
Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville, Tennessee, and a member of the editorial board of Natural Resources & Environment. He may be reached at
jb.ruhl@vanderbilt.edu.
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The Supreme Court’s
Platonic Energy Policy
Scott B. Grover
ith more than a decade having passed since
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002), the U.S.
Supreme Court recently returned to the boundaries of federal and state authority over national
energy policy. Across three factually unrelated cases, deci-sions
for which issued during a 12-month span bridging the 2014
and 2015 terms, the Court considered and determined the
extent to which state action (in two cases) and federal action
(in the other) constituted permissible or impermissible
exercise of power under the provisions of the closely related
Federal Power Act (FPA) and Natural Gas Act (NGA). And
while it might be tempting to conclude that federal authority
took the prize, a collective analysis of the three decisions supports the view that the states made out well for themselves. In
what is arguably to the states’ benefit, the bright line between
federal and state authority that many wanted is not going to be
drawn by the Court any time soon.
Of the three governmental actions reviewed, the Court
found only one unlawful: a Maryland electric generator subsidy
program conditioned on participation in, and the outcome of,
a wholesale capacity auction regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). See Hughes v. Talen Energy
Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (April 2016) (Hughes). Hughes, however, was the closest to a bright-line exercise. In an almost
unanimous opinion (Justice Thomas joined the opinion only
as it relied on the FPA, not implied preemption; also, this case
was decided after Justice Scalia’s death), Justice Ginsburg
wrote that the Maryland program “invades FERC’s regulatory
turf.” Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297. The program in question
sought to incentivize the construction of new electric generation in Maryland by ensuring that the new generators would
be guaranteed some assurance of cost recovery (through a
sepa-rate contract between the generator and a load-serving
entity (LSE)). Maryland structured the subsidy, however,
around the generator’s participation in the FERC-regulated
capacity auction process used by its regional transmission
organiza-tion (RTO) and, importantly, the clearing price
awarded to capacity through the auction. If the auction
clearing price fell below a certain threshold set forth in the
contract, the LSE paid the generator the difference. If the
auction clearing price was above the threshold, then the
generator paid the LSE the difference. Id. at 1294–95. In short,
the Maryland program
“adjust[ed] an interstate wholesale rate.” Id. at 1297. Doing so
put the situation squarely in line with prior precedent, thus
making the Court’s decision to strike the law ostensibly an
easy one.

NR&E Fall 2016

Published in Natural Resources & Environment Volume 31, Number 2, Fall 2016. © 2016 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

